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A THEORY OF PROBATION SUPERVISION
CARL B. KLOCKARS, JR.*
As the literature of probation demonstrates, a
thoroughly eclectic discipline possesses an almost
infinite capacity to generate the most diverse
forms of theory. Probation students' published
attentions to supervision include everything from
afterdinner speeches to decision models. Speeches
tell the reader a good deal about the speaker and
decision models tell a good deal about the officer,
but neither seems to capture what probation super-
vision is.i Decision models cannot be considered
inappropriate since knowledge of decision-making
is certainly of legitimate scientific concern. The
speeches, as well as the dozens of articles which
discuss the question of what probation supervision
"ought to be," can be sympathetically interpreted
as teaching theories. One cannot object to the
treatment of probation problems at this level
either. The vast majority of improvements in
probation services has resulted, not from the sci-
entific demonstrations of efficiency, but rather
through the efforts of moral men from Augustus
through Charles Chute and Rufus Cook to those
who wish to enter the field with "oughts" today.
Our intention is to provide a description and
analysis of the standard form of probation super-
vision.2 To do so four elements must be considered.
Thd first is the working philosophy of the officer-
the way he sees his job and duties. The second is
the organizational context in which the officer
* Assistant Professor of Sociology, Beaver College.
The author is grateful to Mr. John Conrad and Dr.
Norman Johnston for their most helpful critique and
comments.
I Because what passes for probation supervision
theory is so diverse, we shall not attempt any history
of such efforts here. The best article on the subject is
Lewis Diana's highly critical What is Probation?, 51
J* Cn n. L.C. & P.S. 189 (1960). It has received little
attention and less rebuttal. A slightly watered-down ver-
sion of it appears in PROBATION AND PAROLE 39-56
(R. Carter & L. Wilkins eds. 1970).
' The theory of probation supervision presented here
was developed during two years of participant observa-
tion research in a large metropolitan probation office.
Nearly one hundred officers supervised more than seven
thousand probationers and parolees. The theory is a re-
vised and expanded section of a restricted circulation
monograph which the author composed for the depart-
ment: MAKE BELirvE BUREAUCRACY: A CAsE STUDY
IN PROBATION (Mimeo., 1970). All investigations were
made with the full knowledge and consent of the de-
partment administration.
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finds himself. The third is the legal and logical
definition of revocation, and the fourth is the
psychological approach of the probationer. It is
our observation that each of these four components
responds to movement in the other. As a result,
any theory of probation supervision must not
only cite each of these components but also specify
the nature and mechanics of their interaction.
WORKING PHILosoPHy oF THE
PROBATION OFFICER
The first and broadest component of the theory
of probation supervision is the role which the
officer sets for himself and the logic and rationale
he develops to explain what he does or what he
ought to do. So pervasive is this, component of
probation supervision, it gives particular warp
and depth to all other components. Our observa-
tions yield a typology of probation officer1 which
falls roughly between the thesis, "Probation is
not Casework, ' 4 and the antithesis, "Probation
is Casework." 5
The Law Enforcers.6 At the probation-is-not-
casework pole we find officers who stress the legal
authority and enforcement aspects of their role.
Of prime importance to such officers are (a.) the
court order ("His only job is to help the offender
comply with the order of the court.") ;
7 (b.) author-
ity ("I will fully execute that authority but only
that authority delegated to me by the court."),'
3 The typology we present is naturally a compromise
with reality. We do not pretend that it captures all of
what any officer is. Nevertheless certain characteristics
of officer behavior and rationale can be separated and
rendered meaningful for the ends intended here.
4 Blake, Probation is not Casework, 12 FED. PROBA-
TION 54 (June 1948).
5 Meeker, Probation is Casework, 12 FED. PROBATION
51 (June 1948).
6 The terminology here is based in part upon titles
and descriptions suggested for police officers in R. TArT
& R. ENGLAND, CRIMINOLOGY 321 (1964). Our cate-
gories are also similar to those suggested by Ohlin,
Pivin, & Pappenfort, Major Dilemmas of the Social
Worker in Probation and Parole, 2 NATIONAL PROBATION
& PAROLE Assoc. J. 211 (1956).
7 Hardman, The Function of the Probation Officer, 24
FED. PROBATION 4 (Sept. 1960). Hardman adds that he
will "defend this definition before the parole board, the
supreme court, or the angels in heaven."
8'Id. at 7.
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(c.) decision-making power ("Once I have made
a decision, I will steadfastly resist all client efforts
to alter my decision by threats, tantrums, seduc-
tion, illness, etc.");9 (d.) officer responsibility for
public safety ("It is the criterion of safety for
society that will determine for the parole officer
whether the level of adjustment achieved is accept-
able or whether he is so dangerous to society that
he must be removed from its midst and returned
to prison.");.- and often (e.) police work ("What
it simmers down to is police work. We're the police-
men back of the agencies."), n
While these characteristics are found in the
officer at this pole of our typology, we must add
that the philosophies and rationales which cause
certain officers to gravitate to this pole are all
too easily relegated to a "junior G-man"' 2 model.
One may find officers at this pole with examined
philosophies which dictate that firmness, author-
ity, and rule abidance are essentials of social life
and ought to be enforced during the probation
period. What will concern us however is that their
behavior is unshakably law and rule-enforcing.
The Time Servers. For the purposes of our ty-
pology, time-serving officers are nearly the func-
tional equivalent of the law enforcers. They com-
prise that category of probation officers who find
no law-enforcing or casework vocation in proba-
tion. Instead, they see their jobs as having certain
requirements to be fulfilled until retirement. They
have little aspiration to improve their skills; they
are not likely to attend seminars or training in-
stitutes, nor do they belong to professional asso-
ciations. Their conduct on the job is rule-abiding
and their job responsibilities are met minimally
but methodically. Rules and regulations are up-
held but unexamined. They don't make the rules;
they just work there.
The Therapeutic Agent. At the other pole of
9Id.
10 G. GIARD n, THE PAROLE PRocEss 265 (1959).
n Officer opinion cited in Diana, supra note 1, at
199.
12 An epithet common among officers studied by P.
TA-AGI, EVALUATION SYSTEMS AND ADAPTATIONS IN A
Foa%1A ORGANIZATION: A CASE STUDY OF A PAROLE
AGENCY 116 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation at Stan-
ford University, 1967). Social casework has only re-
cently discovered the meaning of "authority" which
sociology has classically held for it. As a turning point,
one might suggest Fink's Authority in the Correctional
Process, 25 FED. PROBATION 34 (Sept. 1961). See also
D. DRESSLER, PRACTICE AND TBEORY or PROBATION
AND PAROL 170 (1969) for a recent attempt to re-de-
fine authority in such a way as to make it palatable to
those who had learned it as a synonym for "authori-
tarianism."
officer role conception is the officer who considers
himself a therapeutic agent. Here, the officer's
role is emphasized in the administration of a form
of treatment 3 artfully "introducing the proba-
tioner to a better way of life"14 by the "motivation
of patterns of behavior which are constructive,"' 15
by "giving support and guidance to those who
are unable to solve their problems by them-
selves," 6 and by "providing an opportunity to
work through his ambivalent feelings.""7 This is
accomplished through the use of knowledge of
the offender history "analyzed in terms of psy-
chological, physiological, and social factors,"18
"day-by-day analyses of recorded interviews
(which) develop the kind of skill needed in the
evaluation of the individual considered for pro-
bation," 9 and the loan of the officer's "own ego
to the client's in the perception and "appraisal of
reality." 20 Charles Shireman has attempted to
summarize this working philosophy as follows:
1. We take conscious pains in our every contact
with the offender to demonstrate our concern
about him and our respect for him as a human
being.
2. We seize every opportunity to help the offender
come to understand the nature of the shared,
problem-solving, helping process by actually ex-
periencing it.
3. We recognize, bring into the open, and deal di-
13 1 have chosen to reproduce the rhetoric of the
therapeutic agent to dramatize both the inseparability
of form and content and the tenacious grasp on a soph-
moric identity which such an acrobatic rhetoric repre-
sents. A leading social casework theorist expresses this
exactly as she shares with us some insights into "proc-
ess":
In short, working from a process base the social
worker conceives all phenomena as unique within
classes or categories, as characterized by contin-
uous change and direction toward an end, as em-
bodying potential for such change which it-
self shifts in the course of time. He uses a process, a
professional social work process, to affect processes,
that is, the life process of an individual, group, or
community, in order that the processes affected
may have the best possible chance for self-realiza-
tion in relation to a purpose which has brought
worker and clientele together.
R. SsAIXEY, Ta)oaY FoR SocIAL WoRK PRACTICE
130 (1967).
11 Glover, Probation: The Art of Introducing the Pro-
bationer to a Bater Way of Life, 15 FED. PROBATION 8
(Sept. 1951).




18 Id. at 43.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 45.
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rectly with the offender's negative attitudes to-
ward us as the representatives of social
authority.
4. We "partialize" the total life problem confront-
ing the offender.
5. We help the individual perceive the degree to
which his behavior has and will result in his own
unhappiness.2'
We find further that officers of the therapeutic
agent type are likely to belong to professional
associations, actively campaign for recognition
of the professional status of probation officers,
display various diplomas and certificates testify-
ing to their skills, and speak in the argot of social
casework wherever possible.
The Synthetic Officer. The fourth and final officer
type in our classification is distinguished by his
recognition of both the treatment and law enforce-
ment components of the probation officer's role.
His attempts at supervision reflect his desire to
satisfy the arguments of both the therapeutic and
law-enforcing agents. Thus, he sets for himself
the active task of combining the paternal, authori-
tarian, and judgmental with the therapeutic. In
so doing, he may unknowingly solve what is al-
leged to be the classical dilemma of corrections.
The most common way of phrasing this dilemma
is that, for therapeutic purposes, the probation
officer must require the probationer to "tell all"
but must also recognize that revelation of the
wrong sort may result in revocation.2 Clearly, a
central issue of probation supervision is the treat-
meiit-control dilemma and its resolution in the
revocation decision.
REvoCATION AND THE LoGIC or TREATmENT
Straightforward confrontation with the question
of revocation should define a strategy of super-
vision, clarify it, and set its boundaries. For the
law enforcer and time server the logic is simple--
revocation should be recommended whenever the
rules of probation are violated. The simplicity
and directness of this answer are not available
for those with a faith in probation as treatment.
Extensions of the logic of treatment demand
not only that probation itself be a treating process
but also that the officer be provided with thera-
peutic alternatives. Such a portrait of corrections
21 Shireman, Casework in Probation and Parole:
Some Considerations in Diagnosis and Treatment, 27
FED. PROBATION 51 (June 1963).
B See Ohlin, Pivin & Pappenfort, supra note 6, at
211-25.
is painted when probation is treatment under
supervision in society, when parole is more re-
stricted training for social adjustment, and when
prison is genuinely rehabilitative treatment which
prepares the prisoner for reentry into society.
When added to this portrait of corrections, such
conceptions as the half-way house suggest an
even smoother curve.
This, of course, is not the case. Probation cannot
operate on the assumption of the rehabilitative
nature of the prison. Instead it must operate on
the assumption of the destructive nature of pris-
ons, and, if it wishes to consider itself a treatment
agency, probation must do so with the simultan-
eous recognition of non-therapeutic alternatives.
In short, revocation must be viewed as the bound-
ary of treatment and the beginning of its com-
promise.
Arguments to the contrary assert that penal
institutions need not be treatment facilities in se
but may be considered so per se. In a variation
on a behaviorist theme revocation becomes a sanc-
tion, probation and parole become rewards, and
the entire correctional process emerges as an ex-
tended shaping mechanism. This argument, how-
ever, is unconvincing. Few institutions, if any,
have been able to demonstrate that their inmates
profited from their stay there. On the other hand,
modern penology has shown that institutionaliza-
tion has a high probability of damaging the inmate
and returning him to society in worse condition
than when he entered. Even if the institutional
experience itself is harmless, the loss of employ-
ment, separation from family, and label of con-
vict are most likely to be harmful.
Recognition of the boundaries and compromise
of treatment at revocation forces those who believe
in treatment to adopt a single, consistent rationale
for revocation. That rationale is that the proba-
tioner is dangerous to himself or others. Consider-
ing the nature of penal institutions, no other ra-
tionale is consistent with a faith in treatment.
Such a conception of revocation bears double-
edged consequences for probation. While this
conception is predicated upon a faith in probation
as treatment, those who hold such a faith must
advocate probation even when, in treatment, it is
not successful. A treatment strategy of probation
with the conception of revocation we have sug-
gested must also provide 'the officer with both
power to guide and control the probationer during
treatment and definitions of desired conduct
which direct and inform him. In addition, this
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power can only be acquired from revocation as a
threat which will usually remain unfulfilled.
Probably much probation work is conducted
by threats of revocation. Our observations con-
firm that threats are regularly used and carried
out by time servers and law enforcers. However,
as a strategy for the therapeutic or synthetic of-
ficers, threats seem to dissolve quickly because
with the single "clear-and-present-danger" ex-
ception they are not carried out. Nevertheless,
for the majority of probationers who do not seem
to break the rules of probation anyway the simple
threat-of-revocation strategy probably works as
well as any other.
The central problem which remains is the resolu-
tion of genuine treatment and control in an effec-
tive supervision strategy. Our observations suggest
that such a resolution does exist. This resolution
is removed from the boundaries of revocation.
It gains its strength from the definition of the
officer-probationer-department triad. It is slow
to degenerate and operates on the medium of
exchange.2
A TAEoRY OF PROBATION SUPERVISION
The strategy of exchange is only implicitly
understood by officers who employ it. Neverthe-
less, it seems to be applied by all officers of the
synthetic type. We know of no other form of super-
vision in which the synthetic officers' aspirations
can be satisfied. Let us first present diagrammat-




FIGURE 1: Supervision Triad
wherein 0 represents the officer; P, the proba-
tioner; and D, the department. Let us now look
sequentially at the way in which the bonds of the
triad are completed.
The Intilial Interview. The first meeting between
the probationer and the officer serves to define
the components of their relationship. It defines
2 The notation used in our theory is roughly appro-
priated from F. HEmER, TE 'PsYcHoLoGY or INTER-
PERSONAL RELATIONS (1958).
not only the restrictions which will be placed upon
the probationer, but also suggests the medium
of exchange through which exceptions may be
sought. The initial interview regularly includes
an explanation of the rules and regulations by
which the probationer is expected to live. These
may range from requirements such as seeking
permission to marry or obtain a pilot's license,
to technical violations such as using alcohol or
frequenting places of probable criminal associa-
tion.u In the department which we studied, many
of these rules may be printed and distributed to
the probationer. Here, the probation officer func-
tions as an officer of the court. Our triadic diagram
is now rendered as:
FIGURE 2: Supervision Triad
indicating the officer's responsibility to the de-
partment and its regulations.
The second substantive component of the initial
interview is an extension of aid, assistance, and
guidance by the officer to the probationer. State-
ments and assurances such as "I am here to help
you," "Your problems and difficulties are my
responsibilities as well," and offers of referral for
employment, family, medical, or psychological
counselling characterize this component. While
our observations reveal a wide variation in the
style of such offers, all are intended to show interest
and give assistance. Consequently, we may now
complete the officer-probationer bond in our dia-
gram as:
FIGURE 3: Supervision Triad
24 Arluke, A Summary of Parole Rides: Thirteen
Years Later, 15 CnmE & DEINQUENCY 267 (1969).
1972]
CARL KLOCKARS
if the officer is able to convince the probationer
of the sincerity of his interest.
At this point we have not yet completed the
bond between the department and the probationer.
It is the most critical bond in the triad because
its completion resolves the treatment-control di-
lemma. As we have suggested above, the problem
of the synthetic officer is that he bears two com-
pelling but patently inconsistent roles, one or both
of which are denied by other officer types. Such
a problem is authentic and our initial observations
and interviews in the department were bent upon
articulating it. Remarkably, in our search for the
classical dilemma of corrections, logically expressed
in the role of the probation officer, we found no
evidence of its existence. Watching, participating
in, and discussing case relationships suggested to
us that for probation it was a logical reality but
a sociological fiction. The synthetic officer is able
to dispose of it by including a managed reality of
the "department" in the case relationship. In
order to clarify this last statement, we report the
responses of two synthetic officers to the question,
"How can you tell a probationer that he should
bring his problems to you and tell you honestly
about the difficulties he is having when he knows
that if you find out too much you can lock him
up?"
Officer One: "I tell my probationers that I'm
here to help them, to get them a job, and whatever
else I can do. But I tell them too that I have a
job to do and a family to support and that if they
get'too far off the track, I can't afford to put my
job on the line for them. I'm going to have to vio-
late them."
Officer Two (A Narcotics Specialist): "From
the beginning I tell them what the rules are. They
know, though, that more than anything else I re-
quire that they be honest with me. And they know
too that if they're honest with me, (and I can tell
if they're not), I won't screw them."
In each of these statements the controlling
element of the officer's role is transferred to the
department. In the first, the officer claims that
his evaluation and position are at stake. In the
second, the officer further separates himself as
the mediator between departmental rules and
the probationer. We may observe that "screw-
ing the probationer" means reporting information
which would be negatively judged by departmental
standards. Because the department is designated
as a distinct participant in the case relationship,
one which bears the sanctioning and authoritative
responsibility, we can now complete our triadic





FIGUpyE 4: Supervision Triad
THE ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT AND THE
RULES Or PROBATION
Before we extend our theory to include the
development of the relationship which our diagram
signifies, it is appropriate to ask to what extent
"the department" corresponds to the benevolent-
but-unyielding-despot role ascribed to it. To free
us, at least in part, from the real differences be-
tween departments, we can observe that no single
philosophical position exists to which the field of
probation is committed. Consequently, value posi-
tions are not closed and substantive evaluation
is not logically possible.25
Since the illogic of evaluations has been of little
concern to more sophisticated fields of study than
probation, an examination of the rules of probation
and the officer's discretion with respect to their ap-
plication is more compelling. We shall consider
three aspects of the rules of probation in their or-
ganizational context. First, probation rules are
generally silly. If they were taken seriously, very
few probationers would complete their terms with-
out violation. Among prohibitions are liquor usage,
gambling, indebtedness, and association or corre-
spondence with "undesirables." Among permis-
sions necessary from the officer are marriage,
change of employment, and travel out of the com-
21 This is in part the thrust of P. TAY-AGI, supra note
12, whose research attempted the exploration of evalua-
tive discrepancies suggested by Scott, Organizational
Evaluation and Authority, 1967 ADmiN. Sci. Q. 93. The
problem of evaluation of the probation officer's per-
formance is elegantly assumed under Herbert Simon's
observation more than a quarter of a century ago:
There is one important difference between permit-
ting a subordinate discretion over a value premise
and permitting him discretion over a factual prem-
ise. The latter can always be evaluated as correct
or incorrect in an objective, empirical sense .... To
a value premise... the terms correct and incorrect
do not apply.
Simon, Decision Making and Organizational Authority,
4 PUB. Anmm. REv. 18 (1944).
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munity. Among requirements are curfews, treat-
ment for venereal disease, and church attendance.
26
Arluke's evaluation of them is worth repeating:
Some parole conditions are moralistic, most are im-
practical, others impinge on human rights, and all
reflect obsolete criminological conceptions. On the
whole they project a percept of a man that does not
exist.P
Secondly, because of the nature of the rules, strict
administration of them is tempered both by the
officer's access to information of violations and
by an attitude of reasonableness toward vigorous
enforcement. Beyond this, however, at least two
authors in professional publications suggest that
probation rules are to be thought of only as flexible
guidelines. = A final point in reference to rule viola-
tion and departmental hegemony is that the vast
majority of information about a probationer's
conduct can only be provided by the officer. Thus,
even if rules were practical and even if they were
stipulated as inflexible and indiscriminate, the
officer would still have the option of providing
(albeit at his own risk) the information upon which
they could be applied. This third aspect of the
character of probation rules in their organizational
context is salient even under present conditions.
It is possible for an officer to "screw" his proba-
tioner.
The implication of these observations is that
the "department," as the genuine bearer of the
authority and control components of the officer
role, is to no small extent a fiction. The rules,
their application, and their dismissal are largely
a matter of the discretion of the officer, who, with
very little personal risk, may conceal or permit
their violation.
EXcHANGE STRATEGY AND THE DEvELOPmENT
OF SUPERVISION
The fictional nature of the rules of probation
in their organizational setting, combined with
the synthetic officer's artificial manipulation of
"the department," introduce properties to the
case relationship which not only increase the of-
ficer's control but also suggest patterns of case
development. If we adopt a market analogy, the
probationer can be considered a consumer who
16 Arluke, supra note 24, at 265.
27 Id. at 269.
21 DiCerbo, When Slwuld Probation Be Revokedf, 30
FED. PROBATION 11 (June 1966); D. DREssLER, supra
note 12, at 254.
wishes to purchase the completion of his term.
In the triadic relationship which the synthetic
officer structures, the probationer is provided with
two currencies. The first is compliance with the
rules of his probation. In following such rules he
purchases his completion by demonstrating what
is thought to be satisfactory social maturity. If
he can complete his term without violation, he
will have little need to draw upon the second cur-
rency which is available to him.
This second currency may be called rapport.
It consists of appeals for aid, assistance, or under-
standing combined with the confession of problems.
For those probationers who are helped by proba-
tion, it is the stuff of which counselling is made.
Honest counselling is possible in this case because,
analogically, the department and officer are dif-
ferent sellers. What cannot be purchased from the
department with rule compliance can be purchased
from the officer with rapport.
The analogy of two sellers which the probationer
perceives, however, is only an illusion. He is deal-
ing with a near-perfect monopoly. The officer
controls the definitions and resulting permissions.
He is able to dramatize his own separation from
his departmental superego by techniques ranging
from forceful re-statement ("These are the rules.
I didn't make 'em; you didn't make 'em, but we
both have to live with 'em.") to revelation of. his
own jeopardy ("My supervisor is on my neck
over what I'm letting you get away with."). While
maintaining the separation, he may also grant
exception ("I'm going to go out on a limb for
you.") or express charify ("You were right to
tell me the truth. We can work on it together
and keep what happened between ourselves.").
Practically, the officer who holds such a monop-
oly has two advantages. First, he is capable of
creating "false bottoms" on the availability of
pardons for violations. The criteria for satisfactory
conduct can be set at virtually any level. The
officer's definitions are perceived as those of the
department. Secondly, the officer is able to adjust
those false bottoms, while giving the impression
of following departmental policy."'
In terms of our original diagrams, the serial
development of probation supervision, structured
29 A complication intrudes here when the decision to
revoke probation is genuinely considered. It is that a
consideration of the judge's criteria for granting a revo-
cation must be made by the officer. If the judge refuses
to grant revocation when requested by the officer, the
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FIGoIE 5: The Development of Probation Supervision
in the manner suggested, can be signified as shown
in Figure 5. The exchange of signs from the O-D
bond to the 0-P bond represent the primary proc-
ess exchange of permission for rapport as the case
relationship develops. This exchange is predicated
upon the recognition of some difficulty in abiding
by the defined rules. In the absence of this diffi-
culty, probation is essentially perfunctory and
there are no structural reasons for the supervision
relationship to develop beyond Stage I. Other
roles may develop based upon personal attraction,
interests, or mutual experience, but from the
reference of an officer and a probationer they are
incalculable. Consider, for example, the officer
who learns about jazz from a musician probationer.
While the transfer of signs represents the pri-
mary process of exchange, that is not all it repre-
sents. In addition, the officer adds to the bargain
an apparent change in his fidelity to the depart-
ment. He can no longer be simply an agent. In
light of the investment which he makes for rapport
with the probationer, he cannot maintain for the
probationer's eyes the same strength of attach-
ment to his officer position. He may, of course,
still hold it, but, in .effect, he says that the job
and the rules are secondary and the man is what
really matters.
Consequently, we have represented the bond
between the officer and the department as minimal
in the final stage. In some cases, where an apparent
team of officer and probationer develops against
department rules, this minimally positive bond
is indeed an overstatement.
DIscussIoN
Several theoretical analyses of structurally simi-
lar positions give formal credence to the conception
we have developed here. Perhaps the broadest
of these is Simmel's analysis of the respective
characteristics of the dyad and triad. Critica l
is Simmel's observation that:
The dyad represents both the first social synthesis
and unification and the first separation and anti-
thesis. The appearance of the third party indicates
transition, conciliation and abandonment of abso-
lute contrast... 30
According to Simmel, the triad offers the advantage
of non-partisanship and mediation roles. This is
the intent and result of the inclusion of "the de-
partment" in the case relationship. Simmel claims
further that the triad transforms the nature of
conflict from its invariably personal quality in
the dyad. He observes:
A third mediating uLial element deprives conflict-
ing claims of their affective qualities because it
neutrally formulates and presents these claims to
the two parties involved. Thus the circle that is
fatal to all reconciliation is avoided: the vehemence
of the one no longer provokes that of the. other
. . 31
In the triadically-structured case relationship the
officer need never come into direct personal con-
flict with his probationer. He can claim to be only
the objective reader of departmental regulations.
Furthermore, the quality of the officer's affective
responses can only be interpreted as partisan to
the probationer's interests.
One can find similarly structured analyses of
specific occupations. The most famous is the fore-
man. Variously called a "marginal man of indus-
try,"32 "the man in the middle, 'n and a "master
30 G. S MEL, Tra SOCiOLOGY op GEoRO SrMML 145
(K. Wolff, transl. & ed. 1964).
31 Id. at 147.
32 Wray, Marginal Man of- Industry: The Foreman,
46 AM. J. SocoioGy 298 (1949).
33 Gardner & Whyte, The Man in the Middle: Position
and Problems of the Foreman, 1945 J. APPI.D A. Tno-
POLOGY 1.
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